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A MINNESOTA JUDGESHIP
By KENNETH C. SEARS*

In the May, i930, number of the ILLINoIs LAw REvIEw there
appeared a discussion with reference to the appointment of federal
district judges. The article considered in particular the appointment of Judge Watson for the middle district of Pennsylvania and
incidentally the appointment of Judge Hopkins for the district of
Kansas. In that article among the closing words were the following:
"So it appears that if President Hoover is really in earnest about
making his own appointments to the federal bench and is really opposed
to the old system whereby the senators make selections for his approval,
the President will find that he will have at least a small body of
senators who will approve his conduct. At least that is what they say.
Whether, as many may suspect, a refusal to appoint the favorite of
any senator and the selection of one not approved by a senator may
result in the appointment never leaving the judiciary committee is still
a matter of doubt. It is something of an unknown factor to contemplate that mysterious thing known as senatorial courtesy. It can
only be hoped that the President at some time during his administration will make the issue."
An interesting situation has developed with reference to an
appointment for a new judgeship for the district of Minnesota.
The new position was created about a year ago. Senator Schall
early indicated his desire that Attorney General Mitchell recommend to the President the appointment of Ernest A. Michel of
Minneapolis. On June 28, 1930, Attorney General Mitchell wrote
to Senator Schall that he could not approve of Mr. Michel. The
matter was then held in abeyance while the primary election 'and
the general election were held during that summer and fall. Ap*Professor of Law, the University of Chicago.
1. (1930) 25 ILLINoIs LAW REviw 54, 75.
[121]
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parently to some extent this proposed appointment was made an
issue. 2 Senator Schall was successful in being reelected and he
again urged Mr. Michel upon the Attorney General. There was
great amount of activity" on the behalf of the proposed appointee
and Senator Schall claimed that Mr. Michel had been endorsed by
both Senator Shipstead and himself, by all of the representatives in
the lower house of Congress, and by the entire list of state officials
in Minnesota and that he was also the choice of the lawyers and
of the voters generally, and, more specifically, that some 600 to
700 lawyers in Minnesota had endorsed him.
Attorney General Mitchell in his letter to Senator Schall the
preceding June had stated that while Mr. Michel had many endorsements he also had more who objected to him.4 In this situa2. Senator Schall has stated frequently that the Michel appointment was
made an issue not at his request but by the action of the friends of Attorney
General Mitchell. Since the Senator was reelected he has claimed that the
voters of Minnesota desired the appointment of Mr. Michel. Obviously,
however, it is a fallacy to argue that the election of Senator Schall is a
favorable vote for everything which) the Senator was known to favor. "
Cf. the following from the statement of Mr. Mitchell on January 24,
1931: "During the last summer and fall I refrained from any public conment because of the political campaign and a desire to avoid anything which
might appear to affect any candidate's political fortunes or appear to make
the judgeship too much a political matter."
See speech Iy Mr. Tom Davis, vol. 74 Congressional Record, p. 7598.
3. The Attorney General in his letter of January 28 to Senator Schall
stated: "The matter of the endorsements which he (Michel) has received
requires some additional comment. Everyone knows that the campaign for
Michel in Minnesota has taken the form of the most active and persistent
solicitation of endorsements, in which his partner, Mr. Tom Davis, has taken
the lead. It is entirely certain that a very large number of those who have
been persuaded to endorse Michel have yielded reluctantly to these persistent
solicitations. I know that Mr. Tom Davis, who has been the leader in the
fight to have his partner, Michel, elevated to the bench, was an active factor
in the last political campaign and an earnest supporter of yours, and there
isn't any doubt about the fact that he has insisted upon this appointment
because of his political support."
4. In his letter to Senator Schall on January 28, 1931, Mr. Mitchell made
the following statement:

".

. . From the moment Mr. Michel's name was

mentioned a flood of protests commenced to find its way into my office and
directly to the President. In mere volume and numbers these protests exceed
the endorsements. I regret that because of the unbroken rule and tradition in
the Department of Justice that such personal files must be treated as confidential unless the person to whom they relate is nominated and they go to
the Judiciary Committee of the Senate, I cannot still some of the claims
of Michel's supporters by publishing these documents."
In his statement of January 24, 1931, Mr. Mitchell made the following
observation concerning Mr. Michel's endorsements:

".

.

.

. I have seen a

published list of lawyers and judges who are said to have endorsed him
[Michel]. Some of the men on that published list have not sent such endorsements to this department. Other persons on the list have contented
themselves with mentioning certain good qualities of the candidate but
have fallen short -of an unqualified endorsement for the federal bench. A
few have privately withdrawn their endorsements claiming that their support was solicited and the endorsements given to avoid embarrassment. No
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tion (for the controversy was the subject of discussion in Minnesota) it occurred to one of the members of the Board of Governors of the Minnesota State Bar Association that a vote of the
members of that association would give accurate information as
to the wishes of the lawyers in Minnesota.5 Accordingly a meeting of the Board of Governors was called on January 17, 1931.
It was there determined with one dissenting vote that the members 6 of the Minnesota State Bar Association be asked to vote
upon the following proposition: "Do you favor the appointment
of Ernest A. Michel to be United States District Judge for Minnesota?" Provisions were made for secrecy of the ballot and apparently no complaint has been made as to the procedure that was
adopted. Letters enclosing the ballot were sent to the members on
January 21, 1931. Fifty individuals, acting under the leadership
of Mr. George R. Smith, favored the appointment of Mr. Michel
and they prepared a letter dated January 20, 1931, which argued
in favor of Mr. Michel and mailed it to many members of the
association very shortly after the official letter of the association
had been placed in the mails. This letter sought to have lawyers
to whom it was addressed write to the President with a view of
urging upon him the immediate appointment of a federal judge
in Minnesota and state that, in view of the situation which had
arisen, no objection by the writer now existed to the appointment of
Mr. Michel. The letter, however, made no direct reference to the
vote that was being taken by the Minnesota State Bar Association.
Ballots were sent to 1,561 members. The ballots returned
amounted to 1,341. Of this number seventy-two were rejected as
being defective. Thus 1,269 ballots were counted. Of these 293
voted in favor of Mr. Michel. 976 voted against him. At the
doubt many on the list have expressed their sincere opinions. We lawyers
know the difficulties confronting a lawyer when solicited for an endorsement
of a man who may have a prospect of appointment and before whom he
may have to practice.
"On the other hand, our file of protests against this nomination is more
impressive than in any other case before the Department for years past.
My refusal to recommend the Senator's candidate is not a mere matter of
my personal judgment. From lawyers and judges all over the state of
Minnesota have come numerous and vigorous protests against the appointment. It requires courage and strong conviction for a lawyer to protest
such an appointment where there is any chance of its being made."
5. The writer is not at liberty to disclose the name of the lawyer to
whom he is indebted for his kindness in disclosing the facts concerning the
action of the Minnesota State Bar Association. Most of that which has
been written in this connection was made public and was printed in various,
newspapers in the state.

6. Ballots were also sent to the various judges in the state.
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request of Mr. Michel's representatives who were present at the
counting, a separate count was made of the city and country votes.
For this purpose Minneapolis, St. Paul, and Duluth were designated as cities. The result was that the city vote was 186 in favor
of Mr. Michel and 614 against him. The country vote was 107 in
favor of him and 362 against him. This vote would seem to have
been a decisive rejection of Mr. Michel. His friends, however,
including Senator Schall, refused to accept it as such.7 While as
stated they made no complaint as to the procedure they argued that
the form of ballot was unfair to Mr. Michel in that it placed him
against all other aspirants. It was asserted in general terms that
some ten to twenty other individuals in the state desired the appointment and that all of them had supporters.8 The result, it
was claimed, was that the various supporters of the various potential candidates, none of whom was mentioned in the discussion,
voted against Mr. Michel and that the vote did not therefore fairly
represent the attitude of the lawyers of the state with reference
to Mr. Michel's competency for the position.
It would not seem that there could be very much to this objection. One can hardly doubt that perhaps fifty or one hundred
or even more of the lawyers of Minnesota would like to be appointed a federal district judge. But the issue had clearly been
7. Their arguments were presented frequently in the press of the state
and in the Congressional Record.
It was frequently stated that 600 to 700 Minnesota lawyers had endorsed
Mr. Michel. Notice, however, that he received only 293 votes. Thus it would
appear that a large number of endorsers ch@anged their views, refused to
vote for Michel, or were not members of the Minnesota State Bar Association and thus were not entitled to vote.
In the New York Times for January 31, 1931, Senator Schall was quoted
as saying that ". . . Mr. Michel received 293 votes of the 978 cast, or
about a third of the total. The city lawyers cast 616 votes, of which 186
were for Mr. Michel, and the country lawyers 362 votes, of which 107 were
for Mr. Michel."
8. Some local bar associations previous to the action of the state association had taken some votes of their members to determine preferences.
The writer lacks information as to the results of these votes except that it
appears that Judge Gunnar H. Nordbye received some votes in a poll taken
by the Minneapolis Bar Association. Vol. 74 Congressional Record, p. 7598.
The writer since has been informed that Judge Nordbye received the
highest vote cast for possible appointees from Minneapolis.
The Minneapolis Tribune on January 31, 1931, quoted Senator Schall
as saying that the Attorney General "by his personal attack on Mr. Michel
has made Michel the issue" and that "fairness demands that some impartial
tribunal pass on Mr. Michel's fitness." This was made after the result of the
bar association voting was known.
Senator Schall copied into the Congressional Record (vol. 74, p. 4224-25)
the complaint of Frank Edward Day that "the two ballots by bar associations" were "deceitfully conducted" and that the last ballot was "takex so
unfairly by forcing Mr. Michel to face the field." He did not specify a& to
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made between Senator Schall and Attorney General Mitchell of
Mr. Michel's competency. Up to this time Senator Schall had
suggested no other person for the position. No other person, apparently, was being definitely considered. So far as it appears
even Mr. Michel's friends and supporters have not pointed out
the name of any other person who was considered in any specific
way as his opponent in the vote. To be certain it is entirely possible that some lawyers in casting their votes may have resorted
to the philosophy indicated by the supporters of Mr. Michel. They
may have thought that Mr. Michel was entirely competent and
entitled to have the appointment; but for personal and selfish reasons they may have concluded to vote against him hoping in the
mere possibility that some friend they had in mind would somehow
be selected if Mr. Michel was not. While that is possible it does
not seem sufficiently probable to make it worthy of any real consideration in determining whether the vote represents that which
it purports to represent, i. e., that Mr. Michel was the choice of
less than a fourth of the lawyers in Minnesota for the position of
federal district judge.
Not very much has been said, as is so frequently said in other
states, that the Minnesota State Bar association is not really representative of the lawyers of that state. The main reason for
this is that the Minnesota State Bar Association is an affiliated
association. Membership in the state association is had by being
a member of a district association. There is a district association
in every one of the nineteen judicial districts in the state. So
while the membership of the state association is not all inclusive
of the lawyers of the state, nevertheless there seems to be no
serious denial that it is fairly representative.
It was also claimed by the supporters of Mr. Michel that
Attorney General Mitchell improperly influenced the vote of the
Minnesota lawyers in that while the voting was in progress he
the deceitful conduct and his emotional letter may be explained by his state-

ment that he was "a friend and pastor of Ernest Michel" and "a Republican
of almost unreasonable devotion."
9. It has been stated that the membership includes about half of the
members of the bar.
Mr. Tom Davis stated to the Senate Judiciary Committee: "Less than
half the lawyers in Minnesota belong to the State Bar Association, because
it is a known fact that the association is dominated and controlled by attorneys who represent the privileged interests." Vol. 74, Congressional
Record, p. 7598. Has any bar association ever escaped that accusation? The
same has been said of the American Bar Association and Mr. Davis has
been a member of that association since 1913. See Reports of Am. Bar Assn.
(1929) vol. 54, p. 1037.
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issued a statement to the press of the country in which he set
forth the reasons why he was unable conscientiously to recommend the appointment of Ernest A. Michel to the President of
the United States. But, as stated, the letter containing the ballot
was ma iled January 21 and it was provided that the ballot must
be returned by January 29. The statement of the Attorney General was dated January 24 for release in afternoon newspapers on
January 27. While it was still possible for a lawyer to vote after
having read in the newspapers of January 27 or 28 of Mr. Mitchell's
views, nevertheless the records of the Minnesota State Bar Association disclose that on January 23 over 800 ballots had been returned and that on January 26, ninety-eight per cent of all the
ballots received were in the secretary's possession. Accordingly,
the statement of the Attorney General could not have possibly influenced more than two per cent of the vote. It is also fair to
state that the Attorney General has disclaimed that he knew that
the vote was in progress and has stated that his statement was
prepared in Washington, D. C., in the ordinary course of business
for release on the 27th in order to give time for it to be sent by
mail to newspapers over the United States.10
Thus we arrive at the objection which existed to the appointment of Mr. Michel. The attitude of the Attorney General was
that Mr. Michel was a lawyer of fair ability but not a man of
outstanding capacity in legal affairs. Nor was he a man, in the
opinion of the Attorney General, who would have been thought of
for the position except for the political considerations involved. 1
It is hardly to be denied that such may be said of a good many
men who in the past have been appointed to positions on the federal bench. Indeed, there seems to be no escape from the proposition that the appointments by President Hoover of Judge Hopkins
and particularly of Judge Watson are subject to this same criticism.
In what respect, then, did the demand by Senator Schall of the appointment of Mr. Michel differ from the demand made by Senators from Pennsylvania and Kansas? The answer is according to
those who opposed him that Mr. Michel was a member of the firm
of Davis, Michel, Yaeger, and McGinley of Minneapolis and that
10. Such is the information given to the writer by his informant in Minneapolis.
Cf. the charges made against the Attorney General that the vote and
the publicity were a scheme to discredit Mr. Michel: Vol. 74 Congressional
Record p. 7598 (speech of Mr. Tom Davis).
11. Mr. Tom Davis, partner of Mr. Michel, was once the candidate
of the Farmer-Labor -party for a state office and he seems to be an important individual in that organization.
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that firm was one of three firms in Minneapolis which have been
very prominent in the solicitation of personal injury cases. The
charge is that the firm of Davis and Michel (the predecessor of
the present firm) have flouted the ethics of the profession in having solicitors and by this means have built up the most ot their
large practice.' 2 This firm had not confined itself to the city
of Minneapolis nor the state of Minnesota. It has had runners,
so it is charged, spread over a number of the middle western states
and the result has been that considerable litigation which normally
would have been brought in other states has been instituted in
the state of Minnesota with consequent expense to the taxpayers
of that state. Such is the fundamental reason for the action of
the Attorney General in refusing to follow the wishes of Senator
Schall.
So far as has been observed there has been no specific denial
of the truth of these charges.'8 Senator Schall in his various
12. In his letter to Senator Schall on January 28, 1931, Attorney Gen-

eral Mitchell stated two conclusions as follows:
"Third, that his law firm has engaged openly and notoriously in methods
of procuring and dealing with personal injury cases which have always been
considered unprofessional and against the public welfare and public policy,
and which in many states heretofore, and recently in Minnesota, have been
put under the ban of penal statutes.
"Fourth, that to appoint him would be an affront to the courts and to
those members of the legal profession who have tried to maintain proper
standards in this matter, and to many other right thinking people in the
state of Minnesota." Most of the letter was printed in the New York Times
for January 31, 1931.
In his telegram to Senator Schall, releasing the latter from further
activity in his behalf, Mr. Michel stated: "While I realize, of course, the
difficulties which confront every aspirant for a federal judicial office whose
professional life has been largely concerned with the affairs of the average
man, nevertheless I would hardly be human did I not regret and resent what
I must regard as the unjust and unfair attacks made on me by those in
high places through the public press. Attacks which I, as a private citizen,
had to bear in silence." Vol. 74 Congressional Record p. 5487.
It does not appear why he had to be silent. Senator Schall apparently
was willing to have his defense printed in the Congressional Record. The
speech of his partner, Tom Davis, before the Judiciary Committee is in the
record.
13. In his letter to the President dated February 10, 1931, Senator
Schall argued: "In all my conversations and correspondence with your
Attorney General, he has never once hinted of any specific act of wrongdoing upon fr. Michel's part. The burden of his complaint has always been
that Mr. Michel belonged to a firm which specialized in personal injury cases.
Now, the truth is that Mr. Michel's partner is the attorney for the railroad
brotherhoods, an organization which extends into many states and which,
incidentally, furnished you loyal support in the campaign of 1928. One of
their features is a corps for protecting injured members, visiting them,
seeing that they are provided with counsel and are not taken advantage of
by claim agents and other unscrupulous corporate 'right minded' representatives. Such a corps is naturally a thorn in the side of the corporation
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statements has tried to gloss over the charges by referring to them
as accusations that Mr. Michel and his firm were lawyers for
poor persons. 'He has endeavored to make an issue by stating
that the Attorney General is insisting upon an appointment that
will be satisfactory to the corporations, particularly the public
utility and railroad corporations. 14 He glorified himself by asserting that he is representing the great mass of the people and that
Mr. Michel is the type of man who as a judge would have protected the interests of the average person as against the corporations.
To a lawyer this defense is practically an admission of the
truth of the charge made by the Attorney General and it is believed
lawyers like your Attorney General, and it is for his connection with such
a system that he mislabels Mr. Michel.
"The Minnesota Supreme Court has declared itself 'unable to hold that
it is illegal or against public policy for an attorney to solicit a case.'
(Johison v. R. Co., 128 Minn. 365). As a matter of fact all lawyers do so
in one form or another. A sign on the door or a card in the newspaper is
really a solicitation of business. Some, like Mr. Mitchell, accomplish the
same result, or a greater one, by joining expensive -clubs and seeking otherwise the society of the rich. If nothing more can be said against a lawyer
than that he is keen for business, he must be pretty clean." Vol. 74 Congressional Record, p. 4517.
In his speech before the Senate Judiciary Committee Mr. Tom Davis
stated: "This is the only opportunity I can ever have, either in behalf of
myself or my partner, Ernest Michel, to refute the dishonest and unjust
attacks made by the Attorney General."
But he uttered no refutation any more definite than the following: "For
the Attorney General to seek to charge Mr. Michel with being an ambulance
chaser is a dastardly and dishonest thing. The lawyers of this country
know how business is solicited, some of it openly and honestly and some
of it surreptitiously and hypocritically by belonging to exclusive clubs and
fawning before the representatives of privileged interests."
Then Mr. Davis referred to an article in the magazine Time entitled
"Chaser Michel" and read to the committee a letter written to the editor
of the magazine by Thomas B. Mouer, a Minnesota attorney. He wrote
in part: "So far as I have been able to learn, Mr. Michel has never personally solicited a case in his life. While he may be responsible for the
conduct of anyone in behalf of his firm, nevertheless to convey the impression that he is a mere solicitor instead of one of the outstanding
lawyers of the state is highly unfair." Vol. 74, Congressional Record,
p. 7599.
14. The New York Times for January 28, 1931 quoted Senator Schall
as saying: "I have yet to be informed of anything in the record of
Mr. Michel which would eliminate him from being classed with the most
ethical of his profession. The protests on Mr. Michel are exclusively from
those right-public-utility-minded men, any of whom should they (sic) be
appointed, would not meet with the approval of the people of Minnesota."
[Yet, when Senator Schall finally submitted to President Hoover a list
of attorneys in place of the rejected Michel he included the name of a
general attorney for a railway company!]
Senator Schall in a telegram to the New York Times (Friday, January
30, 1931) stated: "Ernest Michel is eminently fitted both in character and
ability. It is true he has been a poor man's lawyer. The people of Minnesota
want to know why this honorable title is such an insurmountable barrier
in the eyes of the Attorney General." See, also, the Chicago Tribune for
February 19, 1931; vol. 74, Congressional Record, p. 3524.
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that the bulk of the lawyers in this country will approve the position taken by the President and his Attorney General. Solicitation of personal injury cases, more strikingly stated as "ambulance
chasing," is one of the serious evils of the profession. 15 Yet there
15. See State ex rel v. Circuit Court (1927) 193 Wis. 132, 214 N. W.
396; Ellis v. Frawley (1917) 165 Wis. 381, 161 N. W. 364; State v. Kiefer
(1929) 197 Wis. 524, 222 N. W. 795; State v. Cannon (1929) 199 Wis. 401,
226 N. W. 385.
It seems to be generally understood that in cities at least it is impossible as a rule to obtain any considerable practice in personal injury
litigation unless one either personally solicits or has agents do that for
him. See People v. McCallum (1930) 341 Ill. 578, 173 N. E, 827; Ingersoll
et al. v. Coal Creek Coal Co. (1906) 117 Tenn. 263, 98 S. W. 178, 9
L. R. A. (N. s.) 282.
Many lawyers will recall the investigation in New York beginning in
1928. If one wishes to read of the disgusting situation revealed in this
investigation let him examine Matter of Schleider (1930) 238 N. Y. Supp.
601, 227 App. Div. 532. Schleider employed both attorneys and laymen to
solicit cases for him. He did not like to use the term solicit but preferred
to say that they asked for and obtained cases. Schleider was suspended
for a year.
As a result of this investigation many attorneys were disciplined. In
the following cases solicitation of personal injury claims was at least part
of the misconduct: Matter of Goldberg (1930) 238 N. Y. Supp. 273, 227
App. Div. 502 (no personal solicitation; obtained nearly one-half of his cases
through laymen employed by him); Matter of Springer (1930) 238 N. Y.
Supp. 591, 227 App. Div. 490; Matter of Richrmd; (1930) 238 N. Y. Supp.
647, 227 App, Div. 512 (solicitation through laymen; reference made to
Penal Law sec. 274); Matter of Feurernmn (1930) 238 N. Y. Supp. 656, 227
App. Div. 506; Matter of Vail (1930) 239 N. Y. Supp. 414, 228 App. Div.
217 (solicitation through another and repeated gifts of money to individuals
who brought cases to him); -Matter of Schleider (1930) 239 N. Y. Supp.
311, 228 App. Div. 221; Matter of Schacht (1930) 239 N. Y. Supp.
516, 22 App. Div. 232; Mptter of Mahan (1930) 239 N. Y. Supp. 392,
228, App. Div. 241 (Mahan hired an investigator who without being
told to do so solicited personal injury cases in large numbers; Mahan
accepted over two hundred of these cases per year; suspended for six
months with leave to apply for reinstatement at the end thereof) ; Matter of
Klei (1930) 239 N. Y. Supp. 382, 228 App. Div. 246; Matter of Bovard
(1930) 239 N. Y. Supp. 465, 228 App. Div. 263 ("We think that the respondent should be censured for his knowledge of the systematic solicitation
of retainers for him by the investigators for the assurance corporation and
his acceptance of the financial benefits thereof"; see also Matter of Clherrv
(1930) 240 N. Y. Supp. 282, 228 App. Div. 458) ; Matter of Fieldsteel (1930)
240 N. Y. Supp. 481, 228 App. Div. 470; Matter of Helfant (1930) 240 N. Y.
Supp. 242, 228 App. Div. 479; Matter of Kreisvogel (1930) 240 N. Y. Supp.
C14, 228 App. Div. 490; Matter of Kreindler (1930) 240 N. Y. Supp. 242,
228 App. Div. 492; Matter of Rothbard (1929) 232 N. Y. Supp. 582, 225
App. Div. 266 (hired runners and also paid physicians for recommending
cases to him; disbarred for this conduct in violation of sec. 274 of the Penal
Law-which is not very clear-and canons 27 and 28 of the Canons of
Ethics of the Am. Bar Assn. and for other misconduct; see, however, 241
N. Y. Supp. 867); Matter of Katzka (1929) 232 N. Y. Supp. 575, 225 ApQ.
Div. 250 ("This 'business of ambulance chasing' makes it generally impossible for an attorney to give honorable service to clients and courts.
It must come to an end.") ; In re Dolins (1929) 237 N. Y. Supp. 46, 227
App. Div. 747; In re Burke (1929) 237 N. Y. Supp. 53, 227 App. Div. 746.
For a construction of the New York statute see Irwin v. Curie (1902)
171 N. Y. 409, 64 N. E. 161, 58 L. R. A. 830; Matter of Clark (1906) 184
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seem to be lawyers who justify the business and it is not everywhere
conceded that the practice should be condemned. It is not difficult
to hear arguments similar to the one by Senator Schall that all lawyers solicit business; that the mere hanging of a sign or the paintN. Y. 222, 77 N. E. 1; Matter of Shay (1909) 118 N. Y. Suppl 146, 133 App.
Div. 547, affirmed 196 N. Y. 530, 89 N. E. 1112.
Matter of Seligsohn (1930) 238 N. Y. Supp. 627, 227 App. Div. 480,
reveals how. solicitation of personal injury claims may begin with a
doctor who treats the injured person or a policeman who becomes acquainted
with the case. It also discloses the speed with which the solicitor is at
the home of the injured person. Seligsohn was found guilty of soliciting
personally and through his office clerk. The court stated that he had
violated canon 28 of the Canons of Professional Ethics and that: "The
circumstances surrounding the solicitation ir the instances in the record
are not merely suspicious, they are symptomatic of a practice which cannot
be defended."
Matter of Levy and Hartman (1930) 239 N. Y. Supp. 377, 228 App. Div.
249, is revealing: "The record in this case is made up of the testimony
of the respondents themselves as given in the course of the investigation
before Mr. Justice Wasservogel. It discloses a shameless and continued
violation of the Canon of Ethics and the statutes of this state by respondents
in the conduct of the negligence department of their business, which constituted seventy-five per cent of the total. At the time of the investigation
they had approximately 700 actions for personal injuries pending, and 200
to 300 more in the municipal courts for injuries to property due to negligence.
Admittedly, they could not have obtained that number of personal injury
cases by sitting in their office and waiting for them, so they employed
'runners,' whose business it was to solicit the employment of the respondents
by persons injured in accidents, by a printed form of retainer whereby the
respondents were to receive fifty per cent of the amount recovered, of
which fee the 'runner' was to receive thirty-three and one-third per cent...
The firm employed three 'regular runners' in its office during a period of
six years and also did business with eight or nine 'independent contractors'
who are runners not attached to any regular law office and with whom they
made the same arrangements for one-third participation in their fee. At
times they paid salaries to one or all of the three 'regular runners' in their
employ, but such salaries were charged against their percentages. Sometimes
the 'independent contractors' would, be hard up and would sell their interest
in a case outright to the respondents. It seems that sometimes after an
'independent contractor' had brought in a retainer to respondents, another
lawyer would come in and take the case away from them. At least fifty
per cent of the negligence business of respondents concededly came through
'runners.' The runners were paid either in cash or by checks drawn to the
order of 'cash.' Competition among the 'runners' is so keen that they have
to use automobiles to get around quickly enough to get results. Respondent
Hartman admitted that the firm may have loaned the money 'to their
runners to buy an automobile.' Respondent Levy testified that from his
experience he had learned that 'runners' have a system of getting information at police headquarters; they get telephone calls from police officers; also
information from hospital doctors, or any person who may come in contact
with an injured person. Respondent Hartman corroborated him in this
subject and admitted that various policemen had the firm's cards in their
pockets, but denied the firm paid them anything. Respondent Levy said
his 'runners' did not get information from hospitals but they did get it from
police headquarters and police officers. It was testified there was a practice
of having an indemnity company settle a number of cases for a lump sum
which the lawyer might apportion among the plaintiffs in those cases as
he saw fit. Also public adjusters are used to effect settlements with certain
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ing of a name followed by the designation of attorney at law
upon the window is a solicitation of business; that joining and
participating in the privileges of a club which has in its membership bank presidents and other influential individuals is solicitation
of business. A mind that would make no distinction between such
things as Senator Schall has mentioned and the solicitation of
personal injury suits by a system of runners, whose members frequently are not even members of the bar, is a mind warped with
prejudice, or else not capable of understanding anything except the
most obvious of considerations. It is difficult to believe that Senator
Schall in making such an argument was doing anything more than
to make the best of a bad proposition. After all it is usually impossible to make a case so clear that somebody cannot offer some
words by way of excuse.
Fortunately the profession is not without expressions and adjudications of courts with reference to the matter. In Winders
v. Illinois Central Railway Co."' it was held that the trial court was
correct in refusing to dismiss a case for personal injuries because
of the unethical practice of the plaintiff's attorneys in soliciting the
case by a lay employee, and for the attorneys' conduct in making
a loan to plaintiff of $500 to finance him while the case was pending. The attitude of the court was that while it was not disposed
to minimize the evil of such agreements and would refuse to enforce them, nevertheless this was not a justification for the dismissal of the cause of action for the tort at the request of the defendant. In its decision the court stated that Emerson v. McDonald1 7 seemed to be the only case in the country to the contrary.
Judge Stoie of the Minnesota Supreme Court in concurring stated
what is generally recognized to be true that the practice of soliciting seems to lead in many instances to financing the claimant as
a method of securing a contract with him. Then, stated Judge
Stone, "That element, necessarily present, possibly explains why
indemnity companies and other corporations, and these adjusters are paid
by the plaintiff's lawyer if successful, the amount not being fixed or on
a percentage basis."
16. (1929) 177 Minn. 1, 223 N. W. 291, 226 N. W. 213.
17. (1906) 129 Wis. 67, 107 N. W. 1037. This decision is different
from the problem presented in the Winders case. It is stated in the following
syllabus: "After action brought by the grantees in a tax deed to bar the
original owners for any interest in the lands, a purchase by defendants' attorney of his clients' interest in the lands was champertous, and the court
properly struck out defenses interposed by him for his own benefit, though
in the name of the defendants, and held that defendants were in default."
However, Wisconsin seems to be regarded as in a class by itself
on this question. See a note on the subject matter in 35 L. R. A. (N. s.) 512.
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many of these imported cases are 'made' by perjury." After setting
forth that the importation of cases into the state of Minnesota was
a burden on the taxpayers the concurring judge further stated his
views as follows:
"Nothing need be said to emphasize the vicious character and
degrading tendency of the practice of organized and habitual solicitation of any kind of business by attorneys through paid employees. It
is especially dangerous to the profession, when the potency of the
solicitation is enhanced by the promise of whatever financial aid may
be needed by the client pending the litigation. There is so much evidence of that sort of thing in this record that the trial judge was
outspoken in emphatic denunciation. In his views I agree, and I
think the case should be referred to the Board of Law Examiners
for investigation and disciplinary action, if the facts are found to
warrant it. Personally, I see so much evil already resulting from the
highly organized and persistent solicitation by attorneys of personal
injury business (and I am not now confining myself to that which is
imported; a vast amount of local litigation is being solicited away from
counsel to whom it rightly belongs), and so much more of discredit
to bench and bar yet to come, if the practice is not stopped, that I take
this opportunity of absolving myself, so far as I may, from responsibility for the continued refusal of the courts of 'this state to take
effective notice of the situation. If those who indulge in the practices
now questioned consider them legitimate, they should welcome an investigation, for it would give them the opportunity of demonstrating
the validity of their views."' 8
The Attorney General in his letter to Senator Schall dated
January 28, 1931, quoted from the findings made by the trial court
at Albert Lea, Minnesota, on June 26, 1923, in Moad v. Illinois
Central R. R. Co. This case was one that was instituted by the
firm of Davis and Michel and the quotation from the finding of
the court is as follows:
"The court finds that the aforesaid solicitation of said business was
and is contrary to the laws of the state of Iowa and contrary to the laws
of the state of Minnesota; that the obtaining of said case by said law firm
ITDavis & Michel] and the commencement of said action was the direct
result of the unlawful procurement and solicitation on behalf of said
firm of attorneys through their said agents and solicitors, was and is,
16. Judge Stone also called attention to a marginal comment by Mr.

Justice Brandeis in writing the opinion for the Supreme Court of the United
States in Davis v. Farmers' Co-operative Co. (1923) 262 U. S. 312, 43 Sup.
Ct. 556, 67 L, Ed. 996: "A message, dated February 2, 1923, of the Governnor of Minnesota to its Legislature, recites that a recent examination of
the calendars of the district courts in sixty-seven of the eighty-seven counties
of the state disclosed that in those counties there were then pending 1,0Z
personal injury cases in which non-resident plaintiffs seek damages aggregating nearly $26,000,000 from foreign railroad corporations which do not
operate any line within Minnesota."
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unprofessional and was and is champertous, contrary to the statutes of
Iowa; contrary to the law and to the public policy of the state of
Minnesota, and void for said reasons. To support and sanction such
transactions would be a reproach to the legal profession and the
courts of this state."
Furthermore to show the extent of the activities of the firm of
Davis and Michel it is only necessary to cite Chicago, B. & Q. R.
Co. v. Davis et al.19 In that case the Supreme Court of Nebraska
affirmed the action of the trial court in enjoining Tom Davis, A. E.
Roe, and Ed. F. Murphy from violating sections 9737 and 9738
compiled statutes of 1922 commonly known as the Anti-ambulance
Chasing Statute. Ernest A. Michel and the firm of Davis and
Michel were also made defendants but they were not served with
process. The statute in question made it unlawful for any person with a view of instituting a suit outside of Nebraska to solicit
a claim for personal injury or death sustained within Nebraska and
made it unlawful in any way to promote the prosecution of a suit
brought outside of Nebraska for such damages where the right of
action was in a resident of Nebraska or his legal representative and
against a person, co-partnership, or corporation subject to personal
service within Nebraska. In upholding the statute as against an
argument that it was unconstitutional, the court stated that the
statute was passed because of conditions which existed, to wit:
"It was a matter of common knowledge that a few attorneys
outside of the state, through themselves and agents, were engaged in
the practice of soliciting claims for settlement or suit in personal
injury actions, and also in cases where the injury resulted in death,
with the avowed purpose of bringing actions thereon in some foreign
jurisdiction, notwithstanding the fact that both of the parties to the
controversy resided in the state. A condition existed where agents of
these attorneys were traveling in the state soliciting employment for
non-resident attorneys, haunting the homes of the injured and bringing
great discredit to the legitimate practice of the law. It was to curtail,
this species of 'ambulance chasing' which prompted the Legislature to
enact the statute in question. While the statute is in general terms
and applies to 'any person' engaged in these practices, it was chiefly
aimed against the attorneys. It will be observed that there is nothing
in the statute which in any wise attempts to abridge the right of a
party entitled to bring an action, to bring it in any jurisdiction he
may choose. So far as his rights are concerned, they are not affected
19. (1924) 111 Neb. 737, 197 N. W. 599. Thomas B. Mouer in writing
to the editor of Time stated: "Mr. Michel has never been 'cited' for ambulance chasing as stated in your article. The Nebraska case you refer to,
197 N. W. 599, did not personally involve Mr. Michel nor was he ever
before the court in that case or did the court ever claim any jurisdiction
over him." Vol. 74 Congressional Record, p. 7600.
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at all by the terms of the act. The act was intended as a regulatory
measure to curtail the conduct of a class of attorneys who were guilty
of infractions of long-established ethical 'precepts of the profession.
As a regulatory measure we think the Legislature was well within its
power in enacting the statute in question."
It is to be noticed that in this case the defendants apparently made
no claim that they were not guilty of violating the statute.
It is also significant that in Senator Schall's own state of Minnesota in 1929 the legislature passed the following statute:
"No attorney-at-law shall, through any runner, agent, or person
not an attorney-at-law who is employed by him, solicit a person to
employ such attorney to present a claim for damages for personal
injuries or for death, or to prosecute an action to enforce such a claim,
and no attorney-at-law shall directly or indirectly give or promise to any
such person other than an attorney-at-law any money, fee, or commission in consideration of the employment of such attorney by a
person having a claim for personal injuries or for death, or soliciting
or procuring such person who has such claim to employ such attorney
to present such claim or to prosecute an action for the enforcement
thereof.
. .
"Any attorney-at-law who shall violate section 1 hereof [above
quoted] shall be guilty of a misdemeanor and shall be punished by a
fine of not less than $50, nor more than
$100, or imprisonment in the
' 20
county jail for not more than 90 days.
20. Laws of Minnesota (1929) ch.. 289, p. 360. In the Congressional
Record, vol. 74, p. 7600 the following appears from a letter by Thomas
B. Mouer, a Minnesota lawyer: "In 1929l the legislature passed a law
inferentially legalizing the solicitation of personal injury cases by lawyers,
but barring laymen."
One may doubt whether this statement is wholly accurate. True the
statute seems to punish only laymen and lawyers who hire laymen to
solicit but it would hardly seem to follow that direct and personal solicitation
by lawyers is thereby legalized in all respects. It would seem that direct
and personal solicitation by lawyers is not controlled by the statute. Its
legality would, then, remain a matter of common law.
Mr. Mouer also stated: "In Minnesota, the Supreme Court sanctioned
the solicitation of law business." This statement is not precisely accurate.
Mr. Mouer referred to Johnrson v. Great Northernt Railway Co. (1915) 128
Minn. 365, 151 N. W. 125, L. R. A. 1917 B 1140. That case arose on these
assumed facts: John I. Davis and Davis & Michel (Tom Davis and Ernest
A. Michel) solicited and brought a suit for Johnson. The latter settled
without the consent of his attorneys after they had lent money to him
pending the litigation with the understanding that the advances would be
subtracted from any recovery. No proof of these facts was in the record
because the attempt was made to prove the facts by questioning the lawyers
involved and objections to nearly all the questions were sustained. But, as
stated, the Supreme Court decided on the basis set forth. The lawyers
were seeking to recover on account of an agreement the company made
with Johnson as a part of the settlement that the company would reimburse
Johnson for any sum he should be compelled to pay his attorneys. The
Supreme Court affirmed a judgment in favor of the plaintiff. In reality, it
would seem that it affirmed an allowance for the plaintiffs attorneys, on
account of their statutory lien. The defendant sought to avoid the affirmance
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In view of the above showing it seems not unfair to state that
it would have been very unfortunate if the Attorney General and
the President of the United States had submitted to the demands
of Senator Schall. The appointment of Mr. Michel, as stated by
because of the conduct of the lawyers. The answer of the *court was as
follows: "Is conduct of this kind so against public policy that the courts
will deny to attorneys guilty of it their statutory lien on the client's cause
of action? We freely concede that champerty or maintenance in a case
may be ground for refusing the aid of the court in compelling compensation
to the guilty attorneys. But is it champerty or maintenance or against public
policy for an attorney to solicit business; to pay money to a poor client
for his living expenses during the litigation, or to advise him against a
settlement of this case? We may have our indivjdual opinions on these
propositions as questions of good taste or legal ethics. But in the absence
of some statute we are unable to hold that it is illegal or against public
policy for an attorney to solicit a case. See concurring opinion of Justice
Canty in Gammons v. Johnson, 76 Minn. 76, 78 N. W. 1035. The practice of
advancing money to the injured client with which to pay living expenses or
hospital bills during the pendency of the case and while he is unable to earn
anything, may in a sense tend to foment litigation by preventing a settlement from necessity, but we are aware of no authority holding that it is
against public policy, or of any sound reason why it should be so considered."
It is to be noticed that the court did not sanction the solicitation of
law suits by attorneys in the sense that it approved of the conduct as
ethical. The case does not necessarily hold that the attorneys in question
would have been discharged if a disciplinary proceeding had been instituted
against them.
However, there is no disposition on the part of the writer to approve of
Johnson v. Great Northern Railway Co., supra. The standard there set
forth is weak and low. Solicitation of legal business and particularly of
certain types such as personal injury litigation by members of the bar is
bad policy and unnecessary except as between lawyers in an overcrowded
bar who are competing for it. This is no less true even though solicitation
by laymen is probably worse.
Before the statute was passed in 1929, solicitation by laymen and by
lawyers who acted through laymen had been definitely condemned in Minnesota:
Huber v. Johnson (1897) 68 Minn. 74, 70 N. W. 806 (decision mainly rested
on provision that person could not settle his case except on payment of
fixed sum); Gammons v. Johnson (1899) 76 Minn. 76, 78 N. W. 1035
(worked up a scheme of litigation); Gammons v. Gulbranson (1899) 78
Minn. 21. 80 N. W. 779; Holland v. Sheehan et al. (1909) 108 Minm 362t
122 N. W. 1, 23 L. R. A. (N. s.) 510. See People v. McCallum (1930) 341
Ill. 578, 173 N. E. 827, where the four majority judges condemned solicitation by an attorney through others, presumably laymen. The minority wished
to disbar.
The Tennessee Supreme Court, in a very exhaustive opinion setting forth
the contrary opinion of the court of chancery appeals and the argument of
the attorneys involved, has held that it would not allow fees to attorneys
where a special partner, a lawyer, solicited the cases by approaching strangers,
victims of a mine disaster, and secured written contracts with them and

where the cases were settled by the defendant without the consent of the

attorneys. A Tennessee statute authorized disbarment of a lawyer who had
been guilty of "such misdemeanor or acts of immorality or impropriety as
are inconsistent with the character or incompatible with the faithful discharge of the duties of his profession." The court stated that the acts of
the attorneys were "inconsistent with the character of the profession and
incompatible with the faithful discharge of its duties." Ingersoll v. Coal
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the Attorney General, would have been an affront to the legal
profession. It is submitted that nothing could more clearly demonstrate the viciousness of the practice which Senator Schall insists
upon, i.e., that appointments to the federal district bench are
matters of patronage with reference to which the President infringes upon the customary prerogative of the Senators from any
particular state whenever he refuses to appoint the person selected
by two particular Senators. However, the writer believes that it is
not undesirable that Senator Schall should have been so constituted as to have insisted upon such a striking exhibition of the
so-called senatorial prerogative. The bar of this country greatly
needs to have a settlement of the issue between the right of the
President to appoint and the power of Senators from any particular state, with the aid and assistance of their fellow Senators,
to compel the President to submit to their selections. Perhaps
this particular case is an extreme example of what may be expected if it is ever definitely conceded that the Senators have any
such power. Nevertheless, if the power becomes openly and firmly
established the bar may expect a deteriorati6n of the federal bench
in spots until it will become no more worthy than that of the bench
of various large cities such as Chicago and New York. 21
Finally, the President definitely informed Senator Schall that
he would not appoint Mr. Michel. At the same. time he suggested
to Senator Schall that he submit to him a list of eight or ten men
whom he considered to be qualified for the position and the President also added with some apparent irony that out of such a list
he hoped that he would be able to find "someone with fitness for
Creek Coal Co. (1906) 117 Tenn. 263, 98 S. W. 178, 9 L. R. A. (N. s.)
282 (annotated).
The Wisconsin Supreme Court in a strong opinion by Winslow, C.-J.,
condemned an agreement between a firm of attorneys and another attorney
whereby the latter solicited and secured employment from sufferers of a
flood. It was held that the agreement was against public policy even though
the point was raised first on appeal. After citing several cases the court
stated: "In most of the cases cited the party soliciting the business was a
layman, but it is not perceived how this affects the principle involved. If
it is against public policy for a layman to foment litigation and make a
claim bureau of himself under contract with a law firm, it would seem to
le fully as much so for a lawyer to do the same thing." Ellis v. Frawley

(1917)

165 Wis. 381, 161 N. W. 364.

Later, the Wisconsin legislature decreed that solicitation of business was
a basis for disbarment; and fee splitting was made a crime: State v. Kiefer
(1929) 197 Wis. 524, 222 N. W. 795.
21. According to an article in the New York Times for February 23,
1931, William S. Vare is insisting upon a political appointment for the
eastern district of Pennsylvania. Apparently, no decision was reached during
the last session of Congress.
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that position."22

The Senator from Minnesota for a time refused

to accede to this request, and it appeared that there might be a
deadlock. Later, the President again requested the Senator to
submit his recommendations. On the same day, Senator Schall
abandoned his position of Michel or nobody, and he sent to the
23
President a list of individuals who would be satisfactory to him.
The next day he received a telegram, dated February 19th, from Mr.
Michel releasing him from his obligations. 24 What may have been the

political intrigue behind these movements the writer does not know.
At this point, however, the President made a move that seems
to have been of doubtful wisdom. On February 19, 1931, the
day following the date on which Senator Schall submitted his

list, the President wrote to the former stating that the time for
the end of the short session of Congress was close at hand and
that the names submitted by Senator Schall were of individuals
with reference to whom the Department of Justice was lacking

information.

Furthermore, stated the President, it was advisable

to appoint an individual who had had judicial experience and he
asked Senator Schall to express his views "on the men whose names

I submitted to you yesterday." 2

On the same day the President

22. Letter from President Hoover to Senator Schall, dated February
3, 1931. The next letter from President Hoover to Senator Schall was
dated February 10, 1931, and it contained this sentence: "I would be glad
if you could accept the suggestion in my letter of February 3d that you
give me a list of the names of men who may be investigated as to fitness
for this appointment." No answer was received before President Hoover
again wrote on February 18th. At that time the President submitted to
Senator Schall the names of eight judges, one on the Minnesota Supreme
Court, as men "who seem to have substantial support from citizens of
Minnesota."
The Minneapolis Tribune on February 8, 1931, quoted Senator Schall as
saying that he had "no intention of submitting other names, in fact could
not do so without surrender in the view of other senators." A similar statement appeared in Labor for February 10, 1931.
23. The letter from Senator Schall to the President was dated February
18th. It is copied in the Congressional Record, vol. 74, p. 5487.
24. Senator Schall had it printed in the Congressional Record, vol. 74,
p. 5487: ". . . . I cannot ask you to do more and with gratitude for what
you have done, I hereby release you from further activity in my behalf ......
25. On the same day, February 19th, Senator Schall wrote to the
President that many federal judges had had no previous judicial experience,
including seven members of the present United States Supreme Court and
also as follows: "I would extremely regret, Mr. President, if you should
feel it necessary to disregard the names of the men I have submitted to you,
which was done at your request, for it is an undoubted fact that if your
Department of Justice desires to do so they can advise you by Saturday
morning, the 21st, as to the fitness and qualifications of any one of the
names suggested.
"With reference to the names submitted in your letter to me, I desire to
say'that I have not the same facilities of investigating and passing upon
these names, which were undoubtedly suggested by the Department of
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nominated Judge Gunnar. H. Nordbye and sent his name to the
Senate. Without regard to the merits of the man selected by the
President this gave an opportunity to Senator Schall to claim that
the Attorney General was offering a personal affront to him and
immediately the support of other Senators was asked in order
to block the confirmation.2 6 Without pretending to know that there
was nothing which justified such an apparently brusque disregard
of the invited suggestions made by Senator Schall it would seem
that it would have been more politic to have investigated the list
of men submitted by him. 27 The time was not so short that it
forbade investigation and the possible selection of one of those
suggested before the ending of Congress on March 4.
The appointment by the President of Judge Gunnar Nordbye
was referred to the Committee on the judiciary and hearings were
had upon the appointment. The statements and testimony before
the committee have not been printed in full and therefore are not
available. However, Senator Schall printed a part of it, presumJustice, as is possessed by the Attorney General's
that it should not be necessary, because you have
names and I have done so in good faith, with
in your letter, that you would hope that among

office, but it seems to me
asked me to submit these
the assurances, as stated
them would be found at

least one man qualified for this office.
"There is more than one man qualified for this office in the list of
names I submitted to you, M'. President, and some of them are men with
judicial experience.
"I certainly hope that the appointment of a federal judge will not be
delayed by the taking of any arbitrary position in this matter, for I want
to cooperate with you, and I feel certain that if you give this matter serious
and fair consideration that you can find from among the list of names
submitted to you a man fully qualified for the position and who will pass
the qualifications of the Department of Justice and meet the requirements
outlined in your favor of the 19th." Vol. 74 Congressional Record, p. 5617.
The Minneapolis Journal for February 20, 1931, printed an editorial
which asserted that the Senator's list was a Pandora's box conceived in bad
faith and cleverly arranged to embarrass the President.
26. Vol. 74 Congressional Record, p. 5618.
27. In his statement of January 24, 1931, Attorney General Mitchell
declared: "Under the Constitution, power to nominate, that is, the duty
of selection, rests with the President, and the function of the Senate is to
approve or disapprove such nominations. The traditional practice has been
for the President in advance 6f nominations to receive suggestions from
his party's Senators from the state involved, and wherever the Senators
submit names of men who are well-qualified and about whom there is no
room for serious difference of opinion, their suggestions are generally accepted. But it has likewise been the practice, if the initial suggestions are
unsatisfactory to the Executive, for the Senators to present other names.
The time has arrived for that to be done in this case."
The New York Times for February 21, 1931, states that before sending
Judge Nordbye's name to the Senate President Hoover wrote to Senator
Schall that "all of the candidates on Senator Schall's own list were above the
age limit." Accepting the statement of Mr. Mitchell that sixty is the age
limit the quoted statement does not appear to be literally true according to
the meager information in Martindale's Legal Directory.
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ably that favorable to his own cause, in the Congressional Record
and from this excerpt and from articles in Minnesota papers copied
into the Record it appears that something of a case was made against
the confirmation of Judge Nordbye's appointment. Whether the objection offered-his conduct with reference to a certain grand jury
investigation-proved to be of any merit after Judge Nordbye's
defense was introduced the writer is in no position to state. 28
However, the situation offered an opportunity for Mr. Tom Davis
of the firm of Davis and Michel to appear and make an argument
before the committee of the Senate. In this argument Mr. Davis
frequently flattered the Senate and urged the Senate not to confirm the appointment because that would mean that it was giving
up its rights and privileges and thus it would be a blow to the
prestige of the Senate. He also claimed that the appointment of
Nordbye was a political move to discredit Senator Schall and he
invoked the notion of senatorial courtesy, by which it appears that
an appointment even of a judge who may be personally objection29
able to a Senator is not to be permitted in these United States.
So it was that the short session of Congress came to an end without the nomination of Judge Nordbye being reported from the
Committee on the Judiciary.
On the 30th day of March, 1931, shortly after President
Hoover returned from a trip to Porto Rico, a recess appointment
was given to Judge Nordbye.30 The latter immediately announced
28. Objection was offered, also, to Judge Nordbye's judicial temperament. See U. S. Daily for March 2, 1931, p. 3.
There may be a doubt as to the impartiality of the chief witness against
Judge Nordbye. I-Us name is Truman Pierson and he seems to have exercized his influence in favor of. Mr. Michel. See Congressional Record,
vol. 74, p. 3954.
Senator Schall claimed that Judge Nordbye had "belitted, slurred, and
slandered" him and "has continuously spoken disparagingly of my character."
Vol. 74 Congressional Record, p. 6903. He presented to the committee four
telegrams from four individuals to sustain these assertions: id. p. 7596. The
telegrams were declared to be false by Judge Nordbye. Minneapolis Journal
for March 3, 1931.
Such information -as is available concerning the charge that Judge
Nordbye improperly attempted to influence a grand jury will be found in
the same volume of the Congressional Record, pp. 7596-97; 7602-7603.
But the charge has been refuted by Governor Olson (an endorser of
Michel) who was prosecutor at the time in question and by the foreman
and acting foreman of the grand jury under consideration. Minneapolis
Tribune for February 28, 1931; Minneapolis Journal for February 28, 1931.
29. Vol. 74 Congressional Record, pp. 7597-7599.
30. In announcing the appointment of Judge Nordbye President Hoover
stated: "There seems to be no way, in the public interest, to avoid the recess
appointment of a United States district judge in Minnesota. The calendar
of that court is badly congested, and the sitting judges are overworked.
"Since the adjournment of Congress the Attorney General has applied to
the senior circuit judge of the Eighth Circuit to assign to Minnesota a judge
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that he would accept the appointment. He resigned from the state
district court and started upon his duties as federal judge on
April 20. The legality of the appointment was immediately challenged by Senator Schall. He even asserted that Judge Nordbye as a
federal judge would be lacking in power to make binding decisions.8'
from some other district in the circuit, but Judge Stone has reported that
no other judge is available. An effort has also been made to procure the
assignment of a judge from another circuit, but it has been found difficult
to arrange. The only solution seems to be to make a recess appointment."
U. S. Daily for March 31, 1931. New York Times for March 31, 1931.
31. On March 30, 1931, Attorney General Mitchell issued the following
statement: "No opinion has been asked of or given by the Attorney General
respecting the right of the President to make a recess appointment of the
United States district judge of the Minnesota district, as it is not an open
question.
"The power of the President to make a recess appointment as in the
Minnesota case has heretofore been repeatedly considered as affirmed by
opinions of former Attorney General (sic). It has been expressly held in
the past that there is no distinction between a case where a vacancy results
from resignation or death and the case where the vacancy results from
passage of a statute creating an additional position.
"Whereas in the Minnesota case the vacancy occurred while the Senate
was in session, the appointee's right to compensation for his services depends
on ultimate confirmation of his appointment. The validity of his judicial
acts while holding a recess appointment is unquestioned." U. S. Daily for
March 31, 1931; New York Times for March 31, 1931.
The position of Senator Schall is stated in U. S. Daily for April 1, 1931,
page 2.
In the same paper for March 3d appeared a statement purporting to be
from the Senate Judiciary Committee: "It was further explained that the
nomination being for an additional judgeship, it will not be possible for a
recess appointment to be made before Congress reconvenes in December.
Recess appointments are allowed, it was said, only in cases of vacancies
occurring in an existing judicial position."
The controversy between the Attorney General and Senator Schall depends upon clause 3 of section 2 of Article 2 of the Constitution of tfie
United States as follows: "The President shall have power to fill up all
vacancies that may happen during the recess of the Senate, by granting
commissions which shall expire at the end of their next session."
With reference to this clause two questions of present importance arise:
first, is the clause to be interpreted that the vacancy must first come into
existence while the Senate is in recess or is it to be interpreted that the
President has power to fill up a vacancy that may exist while the Senate is
in recess; second, with respect to such a vacancy is there any difference
between an office which has been newly created and has never been filled and
an office which has been filled but is now vacant by reason of resignation,
death, etc.
On the first point it seems that, with one exception which dealt specifically with a newly created office, for more than 100 years the uniform interpretation og the various Attorney Generals, some of whom have been
exceedingly able lawyers, has been that the clause should be interpreted to
mean that the President has the power to make a temporary appointment
whenever a vacancy shall happen to exist during the recess of the Senate.
This view may be stated in this way, that whenever a vacancy occurs it
happens from day to day until the vacancy no longer exists. Under this
view it has been the custom for the Presidents of the United States to fill
up vacancies which first occurred while the Senate was in session as well as
vacancies which first occurred during the recess of the Senate. See 18 Op.
Att. Gen. 29; 12 id. 32. This point of view was adopted by Woods, C. J., in
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Attorney General Mitchell took the opposite position. He asserted
that the President has the power to appoint temporarily a person to
an office that has never been occupied and one that was created while
the Senate was in session. He seems to be even more certain that the
judicial acts of Judge Nordbye until the latter is refused confirmation, if that should happen, will be valid. It seems to be agreed
In re Farrow (1880) 3 Fed. 112. The opposite view was presented very
elaborately by Judge Cadwalader in 1868 in Case of the District Attorney.,
American Law Reg. 7 N. S., 16 0. S. 786, 7 Fed. Cases 731, Fed. Case.
No. 3924. The view of Judge Cadwalader was approved and complimented
by Judge Caldwell in Schenk v. Peay et al. (1869) 21 Fed. Cases 672, Fed.
Cas. No. 12,451. In re Yancey (1886) 28 Fed. 445 also discusses the problem.
Woods then was on the Supreme Court of the United States and he desirel
in a telegram to adhere to his views in In re Farrow, supra. Jackson, C. J.,
agreed with Cadwalader's opinion. Hammond, D. J., expressed no definite
opinion but perhaps was more favorable to Cadwalader's view. All of the
expression on this question in the Yancey case should be regarded as dicta.
Either view is arguable and what may be decided by any future court
probably will depend upon how much weight that court will attribute to the
practically uniform practice of the executive department of the federal
government. -In favor of this practice it would seem fairly clear that on
the whole the interpretation given by the Attorney Generals and Judge Woods
is the more useful one. The business of the federal government is so
extensive that the other interpretation probably would handicap rather considerably the execution of federal affairs including the federal judicial
functions.
Futhermore in 1863 Congress enacted the following: "No money shall
be paid from the Treasury, as salary, to any person appointed during the
recess of the Senate, to fill a vacancy in any existing office, if the vacancy
existed while the Senate was in session and was by law required to be filled
by and with the advice and consent of the Senate, until such appointee has
been confirmed by the Senate." Sec. 56, ch. I U. S. Code, Title 5.
There is force in the argument which follows this section: "This legislation in assuming to act upon the salary of officers appointed during the
recess of the Senate, when the vacancies actually existed while the Senate
was in session, must be deemed a recognition by Congress of the invariable
construction given by the Presidents to the power of appointment conferred
upon them by the Constitution. In postponing the payment of the salary of
the appointee until the Senate has given its assent to the appointment, it
concedes the right of the President to appoint, although it undoubtedly
embarrasses the exercise of that right by subjecting the appointee to conditions
which are somewhat onerous. (1880) 16 Op. Atty. Gen. 522. See, also,

(1883)

17 Op. Atty. Gen. 521."

The interpretation favorable to the power of the Senate is set forth on
page 385 of the 1923 annotated Constitution of the United States prepared
by George Gordon Payne. There it is stated: "The President cannot make
a temporary appointment during a recess, if the Senate was in session
when or since the vacancy occurred."
The second problem, i. e., whether any difference with reference to
recess appointments exists between a newly created office and an office which
has once been filled, so far as is known, is a question upon which there
has been only one judicial decision. In the annotated Constitution above
referred to, on page 389 it is stated, referring to clause 3 of section 2 of
Article 2: "This clause confers upon the President-the power to make
temporary appointments, or what are called 'recess appointments'. Such
appointments cannot be made unless a vacancy actually exists. An office
newly created which has not been filled is not a vacancy within this pro-
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that Judge Nordbye will receive no salary for his services until
he is confirmed; and that he will be entitled to no salary if he fails
of confirmation. Such is the hobbled manner in which appointments
to the federal bench must be made. The chief factor in this undesirable situation is the apparent assertion upon the part of
Senators of the power to control the President in the exercise of
his discretion.3 2 This amounts, it seems fair to say, to nothing more
vision." The only decision cited for this is Peck v. U. S. (1904) 39 Ct. Cl.
125. While that decision has a dictum that may be regarded as favorable
to this position, nevertheless it is believed that the decision was that in that
particular case no office had ever been created and consequently there
could be no vacancy. On the other hand there will be no argument but that
the office that Judge Nordbye is now filling has been created for longer
than a year.
The statement of the annotator is justified, however, by the decision
of Judge Caldwell in Schenk v. Pea~y et aL. (1869) 21 Fed Cases 672, Fed.
Cas. No. 12,451. Its essence on the question here involved is: "The office to
which Snow was appointed in the recess of the Senate, having been created
and not filled at the session of Congress at which it was created, nor at
the next subsequent session of that body, his appointment was without
authority of law and void."
Attorney General Mason wrote a similar opinion informing the President
that he lacked authority to appoint to newly created offices where they were
created while the Senate was in session: 4 Op. Att. Gen. 361. However,
his opinion in the same volume p. 523- has been regarded as a retraction of
his former opinion. In the second instance, however, a newly created office
was not involved. A vacancy first occurred during a recess. There was an
appointment to *fill the vacancy. After the Senate was next in session a
nomination was made. It was rejected. Another nomination was made and
the Senate adjourned without acting on it. One problem was, when did the
temporary appointment end? It was suggested that the appointment and
the Senate may have ended at the same instant. If so, did the new vacancy
happen during the recess? In any event, Mr. Mason advised the President
that he was entitled once again to fill the vacancy. See 12 Op. Att. Gen. 32,
455.
There have been opinions by several Attorney Generals that the President
has the power to fill. up with a recess appointment a newly created office:
12 Op. Att. Gen. 455; 18 id. 28; 19 id. 261, 263; 26 id. 234.
The writer has not been able to discover in clause 3 any language
which would justify a difference between a newly created office and an office
which theretofore had been filled before the recess appointment thereto was
attemked, excepti that it N ,possible that the word "happen" in the
Constitution should be construed to mean some casualty such as death.
From that rather legalistic argument it would seem to follow that a mere
failure to appoint for the first time to any office created while the Senate
was in session is not casualty and therefore a vacancy did not happen.
However, Webster's collegiate dictionary states: "Happen has nearly
lost the implication of chance, signifying merely to take place, occur." It
might be interesting to investigate the meaning of "happen" in 1787 and
what, if any, legal effect might result therefrom. What should be said
of a vacancy caused by resignation, discharge, or an acceptance of another
office? See the opinion of Judge Caldwell, supra, pages 674-675. Cf. 19 Op.
Att. Gen. 261, 263.
In general see U. S.Code Ann. Constitution part 2, pages 265-267.
32. Senator Schall, according to the Chicago Tribune for January 28,
1931, stated' "that unless Michel was nominated and sent to the Senate the
judicial'post would remain vacant."
In his letter of February 3, 1931, President Hoover wrote to Senator

A MINNESOTA JUDGESHIP

than political racketeering. It is not believed that any competent
and unbiased lawyer would seriously argue that the federal Constitution contemplates otherwise than that the President is to make
his own selection with power on the part of the Senate as a body
to refuse confirmation for any reason good, bad, or indifferent
which appeals to it. It becomes a most undesirable situation when
Senators assert their power to impose their choices upon the President and to invoke a combination among themselves in order to
make their power potent.3 Against such a system the American
Schall: ".

. .

. I am aware also of the implications which have been made

of reprisals against the administration if I fail to agree to this [Michel]
appointment." This letter appeared in the New York Times for February 7,
1931.
On February 10, 1931, Senator Schall wrote to President Hoover that
he did. not understand the sentence quoted immediately above. He added:
"You have never had any such implication from me." In the same letter,
however, the Senator advised Mr. Hoover that he "could not in good
confidence" submit names of other lawyers. Vol. 74 Congressional Record,
p. 4518.
33.

"....

Mr. Schall's theory, one only too often put in practice, is,

in effect, that the President shall consent to a nomination made on the
advice of a Senator or the Senators from the state in which the office is
established. It is unfortunate that in Pennsylvania and in Kansas federal
judges were appointed by Mr. Hoover against his will, against the findings
of his Attorney General. Those two instances of senatorial nomination are
justly, if maliciously, cited by Mr. Schall; but if Mr. Hoover was wrong
then, he has all the more reason to be right now.
"The federal bench has suffered enough from the selection of judges
for predominant pqlitical reasons. The megalomania of the Senate needs to
be reduced, not humored. Mr. Schall's course amounts to saying to the
President: 'You must appoint my man and no other man.' The President
could but resist so insolent a derogation of his constitutional authority."
Editorial, the New York Times,, February 9, 1931. See also, editorial by
John H. Wigmore in (1931) 25 ILLINOIs LAW RaviEw 929.
A previous editorial from the same paper that pleased Senator Schall
so much that he had it copied in the Congressional Record, vol. 74, p. 7605,
was perhaps ironical in part.
Senator Schall before the Senate Judiciary Committee: "To ask me to
indorse Mr. Nordbye is to ask me to betray the people of Minnesota who
elected me and to place in the saddle my enemies. I have, therefore, no
other course left to me in self-preservation than to declare that Mr. Nordbye
is personally objectionable to me. The burden is on me today, Mr. Chairman.
It will be no doubt upon you and our colleagues to-morrow. The Constitution declares that 'the President shall nominate and with the advice and
consent of the Senate appoint' (sic). I hope that the advice and consent
of the Senate will bd against this confirmation . ...
"I personally object to his confirmation, which would be obnoxious to
me and place in the saddle in my state the belittlers and slanderers and
defamers of my character....
"I ask that the time-honored custom of the Senate be enforced and that
your committee and the full judiciary committee reject his confirmation."
Vol. 74 Congressional Record, p. 7596.
Senator Schall's legal argument is that the President is wrong in
assuming that the function of the Senate is to be confined to passing on
nominations after they are made; that the Constitution means that the
advice of the Senate is to be given before the nomination is made: id. p. 7602.
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bar should make a protest and should carry on its protest as long
as the system remains as powerful as it appears to be today. Unfortunately in this particular instance it seems that the situation
could have been handled so as to have made a more decisive issue.
After notifying Senator Schall to submit the names it would seem
as if in fairness a better reason should have been given for the
4
rejection of the names submitted by him.
34. The conflict has been rendered still more complicated by the institution of a contest of the election of Senator Schall. Vol. 74 Congressional
Record, pp. 6898, 6951, 7595: "This contest originates right here in Washington and is an attempted intimidation to cause me to abandon this judicial
fight. . . ." Senator Schall before the Senate Judiciary Committee.

